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We investigate the conditions under which opportunism occurs in international market entry. 
Examining 133 entries into new markets by 38 Chinese exporters, we uncover instances of 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of importers. We study five variables affecting such 
behaviour: managerial experience, market entry share, market distance, young age, and network 
size. While we find no single variable on its own associated with opportunism, we do find that in 
concert they form five configurations of opportunism.  In one configuration, even older firms with 
experienced managers and a large network are subject to partners behaving opportunistically 
when they are entering a distant market.  We conclude that simplistic predictions based on the 
presence of a single antecedent should make way for a configurational approach whereby a set of 













Entering a foreign market is risky and can affect a firm’s long-term evolution (Markman and 
Waldron, 2014). Much influential international business (IB) research draws upon transaction cost 
economics (TCE) to describe the challenges of internationalizing (for classic references, see 
Buckley and Casson, 1998, 2009; Hennart, 1982, 1988, 2009; Rugman and Verbeke, 2003; for a 
recent synthesis, see Buckley, 2016). Opportunism, which Williamson (1985, p. 30) defines as 
‘self-interest seeking behavior with guile’, poses threats to successful international market entry. 
Firms can adopt a variety of governance mechanisms to mitigate these threats (Narula and 
Verbeke, 2015; Williamson, 1985).  
A large segment of the predictive scholarly work on entry mode choice builds upon the 
assumption of opportunism, that is, a tendency toward deceitful behaviour leading to explicit or 
implicit violations of contracts with foreign partners.  Yet, few IB studies have actually examined 
the conditions under which opportunism occurs leaving an important gap between theory, where 
opportunism is a key assumption, and empirics, where evidence continues to be scarce (Kano and 
Verbeke, 2015). One reason for the gap is that mainstream IB theory purports to be predictive, 
meaning that firms are assumed to select ‘optimal’ entry modes, i.e. those that minimize 
opportunism. Thus, by design, the empirical IB literature does not examine the contexts wherein 
opportunism actually occurs, because it focuses on how to avoid it (Brouthers, 2002; Verbeke and 
Ciravegna, 2018).  
We address the gap and respond to calls for more research on opportunism in new market 
entries (Luo, 2007a; Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009). Our focus is on how managers actually make 
decisions as opposed to how they should be making them (Buckley et al., 2007).  In international 
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market entries, both parties involved, the firms entering a host country--exporters for example--
and their host country partners--the corresponding importers--can act opportunistically and thus 
inflict costs on each other. In this paper, we address the following research question: When 
exporters enter new, foreign markets, which combinations of antecedents will be associated with 
importers’ opportunism? 
We look at 133 international entries by 38 textile exporters from China into 41 foreign 
markets, using fuzzy sets Qualitative Comparative Analysis – fsQCA (Misangyi et al., 2017). 2  
We analyze five antecedents of opportunism derived from mainstream IB research (Figure 1): 
managerial experience; market entry share, market distance; young age; and network size.  
-------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------- 
Our main contribution is that we study empirically configurations of opportunism. A 
configuration represents a number of contextual antecedents that must be in place simultaneously 
for opportunism to occur.  This has not been recognised in the IB entry mode literature.  First, as 
noted above, much of the literature suggests that opportunism can easily be anticipated and 
eliminated through proper governance. Second, most researchers have either assumed the 
presence of opportunism as a generalised behavioural antecedent, or have focused on individual 
causes, such as asset specificity (Tsang, 2006; Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009).   Our findings 
differ sharply with the prevailing view of a single antecedent of opportunism.  Instead we identify 
in our data five configurations of antecedents of opportunism (see Figure 2 in the Results section); 
one of them being the case of older firms with experienced managers and a large network entering 
geographically very distant markets. 
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Identifying configurations such as the one above is important for the dialogue between 
theory and empirics, and between research and managerial practice. It is configurations of 
variables taking on particular scores that lead to opportunism, rather than individual variables 




 TCE predicts that firms will choose the governance mode that minimizes their exposure to 
potential opportunism. For instance, sellers of difficult-to-patent knowledge will insist on 
safeguards to reduce the potential loss due to unauthorised use by buyers (Rugman, Verbeke, and 
Nguyen, 2011; Williamson, 1985). However, firms exhibiting some prima facie vulnerability to 
contract violations by opportunistic actors do not necessarily become targets of opportunism (Luo 
et al., 2009). Opportunistic behaviour occurs in specific contexts, but past analysis demonstrates 
that it may be absent even in the presence of clear vulnerabilities (Nordberg, Campbell and 
Verbeke, 1996). Tsang (2006, p. 1005) suggests that ‘the debate surrounding the behavioral 
assumption of opportunism mainly consists of theoretical exchanges’. Other scholars corroborate 
Tsang’s (2006) view that further research is needed to clarify the conditions under which 
opportunism affects different types of transactions (David and Han, 2004; Verbeke and 
Greidanus, 2009).  
The paucity of empirical studies directly examining opportunism and its antecedents in the 
context of international market entry may stem from measurement difficulties. Yet, as argued by 
Verbeke and Greidanus (2009), it is important to study opportunism as an outcome3, and to 
analyze under which conditions it occurs. The focus, therefore, should be on examining 
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configurations of opportunism as opposed to adopting opportunism as an untested assumption 
about human nature (John, 1984; Wathne and Heide, 2000), according to which one either 
assumes that opportunism is absent because firms have made optimal decisions, or that it results 
from the presence of a single, supposedly salient antecedent.  In this study, we examine 
opportunism by importers against exporters entering new foreign markets.  
 
CONTEXTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF OPPORTUNISM 
We searched the top-ranked journals publishing IB and strategy research for studies that 
had ‘opportunism’ or ‘opportunistic’ along with ‘market entry’ in their title and abstract. We first 
searched the ABI/INFORM Collection Database, and subsequently the search engines of the 
relevant scholarly journals, and finally Google Scholar. After excluding duplicate findings and 
articles that were not relevant, we ended up with 65 studies, 42 conceptual and 23 empirical. 4  
Table 1 summarizes our findings. In spite of its importance in IB theorizing, few studies 
have analysed opportunism in international transactions (e.g., Ju et al., 2011; Luo, 2007a, 2007b; 
Zhou and Xu, 2012).  We focus on five antecedents of opportunism derived from the IB literature. 
Table 1 also includes other relevant variables, which we control through research design and 
sample selection. For example, we focus on a narrow range of transactions (sales of semi-finished 
textiles by Chinese firms to new clients located in new foreign markets), as well as on a specific 
type of firm (small manufacturing exporters). This allows us to control for the possibility that 
some features of the transaction, such as its knowledge intensity or the industry and product at 
hand, would affect the level of opportunism in our observations (Zachary et al., 2015).   
   In the following section, we identify a number of antecedents of opportunism in market 
entry and in each case formulate a proposition. We do not use the term ‘hypothesis’ as we do not 
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measure the correlation between an antecedent and opportunism, but rather examine the 
combinations of antecedents linked to opportunism.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
-------------------------------- 
Managerial experience  
Managers call on past international experience to deal with the complexity and uncertainty 
of entering multiple markets that differ in terms of cultural, institutional, and economic 
characteristics (Hutzschenreuter and Voll, 2008). Their international experience helps them design 
proper safeguards when entering new markets (Narula and Verbeke, 2015; Reuber and Fischer, 
1997; Zachary et al., 2015).  As one highly experienced Chinese manager in our sample stated ‘I 
did not know much about the United States, but, having already managed several international 
contracts, I had an idea of what to do...before concluding the contract we searched for all possible 
information on the buyer to see whether the firm seemed reliable’ (Interview, Alpha Textiles). 5 
The international experience of the individual in charge of foreign expansion moves may 
compensate for a firm’s lack of organizational experience. Thus, having managers who are highly 
experienced in international markets can help firms reduce their liability of foreignness as well as 
their liability of smallness and newness, thus avoiding opportunism when entering new markets. 
Although often discussed at the conceptual level, there is no prior empirical study assessing 
whether the absence of international managerial experience does lead to opportunism (see Table 
1). We formulate our first proposition as follows:  
Proposition 1: In the context of new foreign market entry, an exporter’s limited 
managerial experience is associated with greater importer’s opportunism. 
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Market entry share 
Our sample consists of firms engaged in similar transactions—sales in new foreign 
markets by manufacturers of semi-finished textile products to trading houses specializing in 
textile imports.  However, these transactions differ in terms of their importance to the exporting 
firm, with some contracts accounting for the majority of the exporter’s annual foreign sales, and 
others representing much smaller shares.  
An exporter selling a large share of the firm’s total exports would be expected to be in a 
weaker bargaining position vis-à-vis an importer, and hence be more vulnerable to its 
opportunistic behaviour (Klein et al., 1990).  In the case of one of the firms in our sample, the 
export manager negotiating a very large shipment suspected that the importer was distorting 
information to obtain a discount. Nonetheless, the export manager decided to go ahead with the 
sale, precisely because it was for a large share of the firm’s total exports. The export manager’s 
suspicions were later confirmed.     
An alternative argument is that an exporter with a smaller number of international buyers 
can devote more time and resources to crafting effective contractual safeguards ex ante and to 
monitoring contract execution compliance ex post (Jorde and Teece, 1990). However, on balance, 
we anticipate more opportunism when market entry share is large because of increased exporter 
vulnerability, which prevents exporters from introducing more effective safeguards.  It is 
important to note that in our empirical context importers are substantially larger than exporters, 
and so the assumption of similar vulnerability does not hold. This leads to our second proposition:  
Proposition 2: In the context of new foreign market entry, an exporter’s larger market 




Empirical evidence shows that entry into distant markets can have negative performance 
implications (Hutzschenreuter and Voll, 2008) because of greater information asymmetry and 
greater liability of foreignness (Chakrabarti and Mitchell, 2016; Verbeke, 2013). This is especially 
true for smaller firms (Lopez, Kundu, and Ciravegna, 2009), although even the largest 
multinational enterprises struggle with distance once outside the comfort zone of their home 
region (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004).  
One of our Chinese respondents told us that it was much more difficult to manage a first 
sale in Europe than in Australia. Real-time communication was more challenging across five time 
zones than over one or two and face-to-face negotiations harder still because of the additional time 
and expense of travel. The result was that several details that might have otherwise been caught 
were left underspecified in the formal contract.  
We therefore include distance in our model. To keep the empirical analysis feasible and 
parsimonious, especially in terms of the number of possible combinations of values for the 
antecedents, we consider only geographic distance.  While much contemporary IB work identifies 
a variety of distance dimensions, including cultural and institutional distance, a large body of 
empirical literature demonstrates that geographic distance is still the main distance dimension 
affecting IB transactions. Dow and Karunaratna (2006, pp. 593-94), for example, find that 
‘Geographic distance accounts for almost twice as much total variance explained as all the other 
psychic distance stimuli combined; and this is for a set of industries (Conlon, 1985) explicitly 
identified as having low transportation costs!’ We formulate our third proposition as follows:  
Proposition 3: In the context of new foreign market entry, a greater geographic distance 




Firms acquire organizational knowledge by documenting successful and unsuccessful 
events, and then crafting managerial practices to help managers in future endeavours. Younger 
firms have less opportunity to acquire and codify such information. This makes them more 
susceptible to opportunism, a point captured by the ‘liability of newness’ concept (Brüderl and 
Schussler, 1990; Markman et al., 2009; Mudambi and Zahra, 2007; Stinchcombe, 1965). One 
exporter in our sample confirmed this in saying that the firm had been exporting for many years 
and had developed processes specifying what to do when entering a new market, and that this had 
helped when encountering opportunistic behaviour on the part of importers. Our fourth 
proposition is therefore:  
Proposition 4: In the context of new foreign market entry, an exporter’s younger age is 
associated with greater importer’s opportunism. 
Network Size 
Firms can leverage networks to mitigate the risk of importer opportunism (Ellis, 2011; 
Zhou et al., 2007). A network can provide access to information not readily available elsewhere 
(Ciravegna et al., 2014; Johanson and Vahlne, 2009). We only consider networks that exporters 
can access for local market intelligence—we do not consider the networks of the importers. We 
therefore include network size as one of the antecedents of opportunism. We do recognize that 
other network characteristics such as centrality and frequency can be important, but no reliable 
data on these dimensions were available from our survey instrument. Our fifth proposition is:  
Proposition 5: In the context of a new foreign market entry, an exporter’s smaller network 
is associated with greater importer’s opportunism.  
Aligning theory and research methods 
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Actual opportunistic behaviour results from several explanatory variables taking on 
specific values at the same time. Each situation should be looked at in its entirety. Rather than 
seeing opportunism simply as taking the value of 0 (not present) or 1 (present) as a function of 
narrow transaction characteristics and the use of safeguards (s = 0 or s > 0), as put forward by 
Willliamson (1985), we consider important antecedents of opportunism and their interactions so 
as to identify configurations of opportunism.  Investigating such configurations can greatly 
improve our understanding (Luo, 2007a; Rugman et al., 2011; Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009).  
Our approach is different from that of extant studies of opportunism in the IB literature 
that search for linear relationships between causes and effects (Welch et al., 2011). That approach 
can hide the impact of configurations of antecedents of opportunism (i.e., joint effects), although 
these might actually drive the results (Fiss, 2011). In novel international settings, for example, the 
lack of an experienced manager may lead to opportunism only when the exporting firm is small 
and young, while larger and older exporters may be better equipped to leverage their domestic 
experience. 
Here, we examine opportunism using a configurational approach. We study the 
combinations of factors that lead market entries to be vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour by 
importers. The configurations we examine also provide insight into what could be done to 
mitigate opportunism.  In the next section we explain our methodological approach in more detail.  
 
METHODS 
Data and Definitions 
Entering a new market entails managing in a previously unknown context with possible 
adverse consequences  (Carmeli and Markman, 2011). We examine the antecedents of 
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opportunism in international market entry, defining opportunism as deceitful behaviour that 
amounts to explicit or implicit contract violations. We follow the suggestion that scholars should 
study the ‘wider set of antecedents, contingencies, and consequences’ of market entry (Journal of 
Management Studies [Call for Papers], 2016).  
Our market entries are the initial export sales of Chinese textile producers to new target 
countries. In line with other studies of Chinese firms (Verbeke and Yuan, 2013), we collected data 
through face-to-face interviews with the highest-placed international sales managers available, in 
most cases the firm’s general manager. The interviews took place between January 2008 and 
December 2009. They were conducted in Cantonese or Mandarin with the support of a local 
consultant.  
Collecting empirical evidence on opportunism, especially from Chinese firms, is 
challenging, and so we were not able to obtain dyadic data on outcomes (Verbeke and Yuan, 
2013; Zhou and Xu, 2012). This is not a critical weakness. Opportunism involves a ‘victim’ and a 
‘violator’. If the goal of the research had been to assess the veracity of exporting firms’ claims of 
contract violation, it would have made little sense to listen to the self-described victims without 
considering the views of the other party. We consider the claim of deceitful behaviour to be true 
because each victim identified some instances where deceit was absent. 
Following Podsakoff et al. (2003) and Chang et al. (2010), we took several steps to control 
for common method variance. We conducted a pilot study with 13 firms to verify the clarity and 
appropriateness of the interview items and to explore potential sources of ambiguity and used the 
results to alter our instrument. We assured our respondents that their answers would remain 
confidential and that there was no ‘correct’ answer to any question. We used filtering questions in 
the questionnaire and interspersed questions about opportunism with requests for basic 
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information on the firm and about the industry (Murray et al., 2005).  Filtering questions creates 
psychological breaks between questions on outcomes and antecedents, which helps control for 
potential common method variance (Conway and Lance, 2010; Kammeyer-Mueller et al., 2010; 
Podsakoff et al., 2003).  We also gave the respondents a temporal and psychological break by 
interrupting the interview with offers of refreshments and questions unrelated to the research. We 
ensured that our model included both perceptual and non-perceptual variables, as well as different 
measurements and scales (Chang et al., 2010).  
Our outcome, the presence or absence of opportunism, is a perceptual parameter, based on 
six Likert-scale items. All other variables are factual and continuous at the outset (managerial 
experience, market distance, network size, young age) except for market entry share, which is a 
percentage. We measured firm age and geographic distance using the information provided by the 
respondents, which we corroborated with archival data and official registries.  
Our sample consists of locally-owned, small Chinese exporters (defined as firms with less 
than 250 employees, in line with the OECD 2005 criterion for smallness) willing to make 
available for interview the most senior manager in charge of the market entry (general manager or 
high-level export sales manager).  We did not include large firms because we wanted to be certain 
that we talked to the actual managers responsible for specific foreign sales contracts.6  After 
excluding firms with missing data, and firms unwilling or unable to disclose information about 
their market entries, we were left with 38 firms making a total of 133 market entries. The firms 
entered new markets by selling to importers, who then further distributed the products to corporate 
buyers. Each exporter made on average 3.5 market entries, with a minimum of two and a 
maximum of six.  We documented each market entry via interviews with the respondents and 
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complemented the interviews with archival data. We now describe the method we used and the 
operationalization of our variables. 
Data Analysis: fsQCA 
We used fsQCA, a method based on fuzzy sets that has been applied several times in 
recent strategy research (Fiss, 2011; Judge et al., 2015; Kennedy and Fiss, 2013; Misangyi et al., 
2017; Brenes, Ciravegna, and Woodside, 2017). There are three main reasons why fsQCA is an 
appropriate methodological approach for this study. First, opportunism is critical in TCE, but 
empirical evidence on it, especially in the context of new market entry, is scant (Tsang, 2006). We 
needed to test assumptions by establishing typologies and assessing interactions. Second, TCE 
comes into sharper focus when its assumptions are addressed in a ‘configurational’ fashion. 
Williamson (1985, p. 31) describes, at the general theory level, the attributes of the contracting 
process in configurational terms, arguing that four contracting processes arise from different 
combinations of behavioural assumptions and asset specificity.  In one example, he argues that in 
the absence of opportunism, but when bounded rationality and asset specificity are present, the 
implied contracting process is a ‘promise’. He sees contracting processes as resulting from 
configurations of antecedents. Third, correlational methods assume relationships among variables 
that are additive and symmetrical, but we are interested in complex relationships among 
contextual variables that may show different paths to outcomes (equifinality). We do not argue 
that this approach is superior to conventional correlational methods, but we do consider fsQCA 
uniquely suitable to address the type of research question we explore.  
The fsQCA empirical approach is based on fuzzy sets. FsQCA allows us to examine the 
extent to which each market entry ‘belongs’ (full membership) or ‘does not belong’ (full non-
membership) to the set of entries affected by opportunism, or whether it falls somewhere between 
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the two extremes. This determination process, called ‘calibration’, is explained in more detail 
below.   
Following established practice in fsQCA studies (Fiss et al., 2013), we calibrated all 
variables--the outcome variable opportunism and the five antecedents--using three values. The 
value of 1 represents full membership.  It reflects the market entries that are fully and clearly 
positioned within a set, for example entries that clearly occurred in a distant market.  The value of 
0 represents full non-membership, or market entries that are clearly outside a given set, for 
example an entry clearly targeting a market that was not distant. The value of 0.5 represents the 
point of ‘maximum ambiguity’, or the score that defines a boundary between being ‘in’ or ‘out’. 
We calibrated membership of the market entries into the corresponding fuzzy sets using 
knowledge from prior empirical studies and other external benchmarks (Fiss et al., 2013, pp. 4-
17). Below, we explain how fsQCA was applied to the outcome variable and to each of the five 
antecedents. 
Opportunism and its Antecedents 
Opportunism. Building on earlier research (Ju et al., 2011; Katsikeas et al., 2009; Parkhe, 
1993; Provan and Skinner, 1989), we measured opportunism through an instrument based on John 
(1984).7  The 1 to 7 Likert scale presented to the respondents reflected views ranging between ‘1’ 
for ‘very strongly disagree’ and ‘7’ for ‘very strongly agree’. We averaged the values received for 
each of the six items to establish the presence of opportunism (α = 0.95). In our survey instrument, 
a score of 7 entails full membership in the set of market entries associated with opportunism, 
whereas a score of 1 entails full non-membership in the same set. Thus, the outcome variable, 
opportunism, was calibrated by setting 7 as the full membership score (i.e., high opportunism by 
the importer), and 1 as the full non-membership score (no opportunism). We chose 4, the 
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midpoint of the scale reflecting the answer ‘neither agree, nor disagree’, as the point of maximum 
ambiguity following fsQCA method guidelines (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Since we use 
fuzzy sets, ‘continuous set’ memberships were determined using the log odds method outlined by 
Ragin (2008). Through this fsQCA calibration process, necessarily performed for both the 
outcome variable and each antecedent, we were able to distinguish between the market entries 
affected by opportunism and those not affected by it, and the configurations of antecedents 
associated with opportunism. The configurations illustrated in Figure 2 represent the entries 
affected by opportunism.   
Managerial experience. Empirical evidence suggests that experienced managers can 
compensate for the absence of other opportunism-mitigating mechanisms, such as internalizing 
transactions or relying on a firm’s routines developed over time (Narula and Verbeke, 2015; 
Reuber and Fischer, 1997). We measured this variable using the number of years of international 
experience the export manager had at the time of market entry. Such experience is typically 
associated with better decision-making (Taylor, 1975). In business research, managerial 
experience is often considered a dichotomous variable (i.e., the firm’s managers have experience 
or not). Yet, it is hard to determine how much experience is required to obtain a better outcome. In 
our view, making a crisp distinction between firms with managers who have experience and those 
who do not, would not be optimal since the length of experience is also relevant. Our data show 
managers with as much as 33 years of experience and as little as one, with a median of five years, 
and a similar standard deviation. We define zero years of experience as the reference point for full 
non-membership into the set of market entries with managerial experience. A total of five years of 
experience defines the point of maximum ambiguity, whereas we chose 20 years (i.e., the five-
year median, augmented by three standard deviations) as the anchor indicating full membership in 
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the set of entries by firms with managerial experience. We validated our calibration using prior 
research (see Brooks and Rosson, 1982; Forbes, 2005; Garnier, 1982; Karafakioglu, 1986; 
Sambharya, 1996; Shrader et al. 2000; Taylor, 1975).  
Market entry share. Market entry share is the percentage of total firm exports represented 
by the market entry in the year following entry. This is a proxy for the importance of the market 
entry for the exporting firm.  The larger the market entry share, the more we expect the export 
manager to want to ‘close the deal’, making the exporting firm vulnerable to opportunistic 
behaviour by the importer. Our data show market entry shares varying between 2% and 80% of 
total exports, with a mean value of 21%. We defined a 0% share as the reference point for full 
non-membership in the set large market entry share, and a 22.5% share as the point of maximum 
ambiguity. We selected 22.5% as a ‘midpoint’ between 20 and 25 in order to avoid the specific 
values of 20% and 25%, each with several observations, as this would have meant losing many 
data points. The respondents were well aware of the share of each market entry, but typically 
stated percentages in rounded terms (such as 20, 25, 50 or 80%). We chose 100% as the anchor 
for full membership in the large market entry share category. We could not rely on any prior 
literature to establish credibly the market entry share that makes an exporter vulnerable to 
opportunism, but settled, based on the interviews, on a share of one fifth to one quarter.  
Market distance. Distance amplifies information asymmetries and the challenges of 
operating in a new, unknown, market (i.e., the liability of ‘outsidership’).  Exporters who are less 
familiar with distant markets will need to implement costlier measures to prevent opportunism by 
importers (Hutzschenreuter and Voll, 2008).  Such measures can include meeting abroad with the 
importing firm before signing the contract or whenever major problems arise in contract 
execution.   
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As said earlier, we only consider geographic distance to keep the number of possible 
combinations in the fuzzy sets manageable. Geographic distance is relevant from a semi-
globalization, or home region versus rest of the world, perspective (Rugman and Verbeke, 2007). 
It results in large reductions in general levels of perceived reliability and sympathy (Ghemawat, 
2011). We measured it as the distance in kilometers from the exporting port to the main port of the 
importing country, using the online calculator of SeaRates.com (2014). Our data show that our 
exporters either make regional exports to countries located within a 4,000 km range from China 
(Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Thailand) or target more distant countries (e.g., the United States, Italy, 
Argentina).  We chose zero km as the reference point for full non-membership in the set of distant 
market entries and 4,000 km as the point of maximum ambiguity because this is the distance at 
which intra-regional exports morph into inter-regional ones. We chose 11,000 km, being close to 
the highest port-to-port distance in our observations, as the anchor indicating full membership in 
the set of distant market entries. This is the case of Argentina, which is fully in the set of high-
distance entries. In contrast, Taiwan, with the shortest distance from China, is close to full non-
membership in the set of distant market entries, while Saudi Arabia is close to the point of 
maximum ambiguity.  
Young age. Firm age is a proxy for organizational experience. Older firms have 
accumulated more organizational experience, and are better prepared to anticipate and prevent 
opportunism.  For example, they are likely to document cases of opportunistic behaviour and 
structure internal decision-making processes to prevent its occurrence in future sales. Younger 
firms, on the contrary, suffer from the liability of newness, and this may make them more 
vulnerable to opportunism (Brüderl and Schussler, 1990; Mudambi and Zahra, 2007; 
Stinchcombe, 1965).  We measured firm age as the number of years between the birth of a firm 
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and the year of market entry. We conducted a literature review to guide us in selecting relevant 
intervals for calibration. A number of authors define ‘early’ internationalization as occurring 
within three years of a firm’s founding (Zhou et al., 2007), while others suggest a timespan of five 
to six years (Zahra et al., 2000). Firm age at internationalization ranges from zero to 21 years, 
with a median of three years. Following Zahra et al. (2000), we chose zero years for full 
membership in the set of young age, i.e., the set of firms that exported within the first year after 
inception, and six years as the point of maximum ambiguity, which defines the boundary between 
being ‘in’ or ‘out’ of the set of young firms.  We doubled this number, and chose 12 years as the 
year of full non-membership in the young age set of firms (with all firms older than 12 years also 
having full non-membership). We defined continuous set memberships using the log odds method 
outlined by Ragin (2008); we did not code firms simply as young or old but established degrees of 
membership in the set of early exporters. As with the other variables, fuzzy sets allow establishing 
how far a firm is removed from one or the other extreme, and following this approach, fuzzy set 
principles can be used to explore the questions of interest (Ragin, 2006).  
Network size.  Exporting firms use networks to acquire information about new markets and 
about the importers in them (Ellis, 2011). The information thus obtained can help mitigate the risk 
of opportunism in market entry. The network in this instance is likely to signal which importers to 
avoid because of a reputation of deceitful behaviour (Ciravegna et al., 2014).  Exporters who do 
not have a large enough network will rely on ‘arm’s length’ resources, for example publicly 
available information on a potential importer’s financial situation, but such information may be 
insufficient to signal the likelihood of opportunism.  We measure the size of the exporters’ 
network by asking how many personal contacts they have in each market entered. Our data show 
this to be 15.2 on average, with a median of 10 and a range of three to 100. The data were highly 
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dispersed, with some concentration around ‘tentative’ scores of 10 contacts (in 34 cases) and 20 
contacts (in 15 cases). The precision of this information is fully dependent on the recollection of 
the individual interviewees of the situation at the time of entry, rather than at the time of the 
interview. Here again our assessment is that the quality of the recollection was typically good, but 
that managers gave rounded numbers for larger networks. To validate our calibration we relied on 
external sources following fsQCA guidelines (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). In a study of 
firms based in emerging economies, Batjargal (2007) reports the mean size of networks of smaller 
firms in China and Russia at 3.92 (with a standard deviation of 1.45) and 4.63 (with a standard 
deviation of 1.13). Drawing upon these findings, we set 4.5 as the point of maximum ambiguity, 0 
as the threshold score indicating that the market entry is fully outside the set of entries by firms 
with a large network size, and 25 as the number of contacts qualifying a firm for full membership 
in such a set.  
The fsQCA Model 
Having calibrated each market entry (see summary in Table 2), we identified plausible 
configurations of opportunism.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here. 
-------------------------------- 
 
In fsQCA, ‘consistency’ is used to measure how strongly configurations (or combinations 
of factors) are linked to an outcome, in our case opportunism. We measured it using the following 
equation: Consistency (XiYi) = [min(Xi,Yi)]/(Xi), with Xi the degree of membership in a 
configuration and Yi the degree of membership in the actual outcome (Ragin, 2008). Table 3 
shows the values of plausible configurations with the chosen minimum threshold and the 




Insert Table 3 about here. 
--------------------------------  
 
We used a consistency threshold of 0.85, following the fsQCA method literature (Ragin, 
2000; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). We chose this consistency threshold as the basis to claim 
‘sufficiency’ for the plausible configurations considered, within the confines of our limited 
dataset. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here. 
-------------------------------- 
Results 
We found five configurations of antecedents linked to opportunism in the context of 
foreign market entries of Chinese textile exporters (Table 4). The formal Boolean expression for 
the outcome of opportunism is:  
YNE + YDE + YSDN + DEYS + DENY  O 
The letter O represents the outcome of opportunism, Y (young age) the antecedent 
‘belonging to the set of firms that internationalised early’; E having an experienced manager 
(which we expect helps avoid opportunism); N having a large network (which again, we expect 
helps avoid opportunism); D having entered a distant market; and S an entry that accounts for a 
large share of total exports in the year it occurred. The sign ‘’ appearing on the left of an 
antecedent indicates non-membership in a given set. If D appears as an antecedent, it means not 
belonging to the set of entries into distant markets. 
        Table 4 summarizes the results. Each column represents a combination of antecedents, or 
a configuration, linked to opportunism. Black circles indicate that the presence of an antecedent 
links to the outcome. For example, young age was an antecedent of opportunism in configurations 
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1, 2 and 3. A white circle with a cross indicates that opportunism links with the absence of the 
antecedent. For example, absence of managerial experience led to opportunism in configurations 
1 and 2. A white square in the table means that the presence or absence of the antecedent did not 
affect the outcome. Having a large network size was not relevant for opportunism in 
configurations 2 and 4. Figure 2 describes the five configurations.  
 
-------------------------- 




The objective of this study was to examine opportunism and its antecedents in the context 
of entries into new foreign markets. We found five configurations that are ‘equifinally’ linked 
with opportunism, three involving firms that internationalised at a young age, and two involving 
older firms. These configurations, each reflecting a complex context of antecedents, imply that the 
firms involved faced opportunistic behaviour from importers when entering a new market under 
the following conditions.  
Configuration 1 – Young firms lacking both an experienced manager and a large network.  
A young firm will face opportunism when entering a new market if it is without an experienced 
export manager and also without a sizeable network in the host country, irrespective of geographic 
distance. This configuration illustrates the challenges of entering a new market for firms that lack 
experience and networks, whether at the level of the manager or that of the organization, captured 
through firm age. We find evidence that young firms without experienced managers and sizeable 
networks are vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour by importers when entering new markets, 
which is consistent with the mainstream literature on market entry (see e.g. Markman et al., 2009; 
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Zachary et al., 2015), and with IB studies on networks (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009) and 
experience (Reuber and Fischer, 1997). From a managerial perspective, this configuration 
suggests that young firms should compensate for the liability of newness with managerial 
experience and larger networks.  
Configuration 2 – Young firms lacking an experienced manager and entering a distant 
market.  A young firm will face opportunism when lacking managerial experience and entering a 
distant market, irrespective of the size of its network. This configuration reveals the interplay 
between distance, firm age, managerial experience, and networks. It shows that if the market 
entered is distant, a young firm without an experienced manager can be subject to opportunism 
even if it has a large network. The managerial implication in this case is that networks, which can 
compensate for the lack of managerial experience and for the liability of newness (Coviello, 
2006), will not be effective when the target market is very distant.  
Configuration 3 – Young firms lacking a large network, entering a non-distant market, 
with a large market entry share. A young firm without the benefit of a sizeable network will face 
opportunism when engaging in a geographically close market entry that represents a large share of 
its total exports, irrespective of managerial experience. This configuration reveals the complexity 
of the antecedents of opportunism. Managerial experience is an important mechanism to mitigate 
opportunism and facilitate market entry, as shown by extant research (Zachary et al., 2015). 
However, it is not sufficient to prevent opportunism in all market entries. Our study suggests that 
when an entry represents a large share of the firm’s total sales, young exporters may be too 
willing to close the deal as the perceived opportunity costs of forfeiting it will appear too high. As 
one manager described it, the fear that the ‘stakes are too high’ causes a young firm to move 
ahead without exercising due diligence, thus exposing itself to opportunism (Interview, Beta 
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Textiles).8 The managerial implication in this case is that the incentive to conclude a large sale 
should never be allowed to override due diligence when entering a new market, even when the 
decision maker is experienced.  
Our results suggest that being a ‘young’ firm can lead to opportunistic behaviour by 
importers in a number of instances when there is a gap between a firm’s capabilities and the 
challenges it faces. In contrast, configurations 4 and 5 feature older firms, which do not suffer 
from the liability of newness.  
Configuration 4 – Older firms with an experienced manager, entering a distant market, 
with a small market entry share. An older firm with an experienced manager will face 
opportunism when entering a distant market with a sale representing a small share of its total 
exports, irrespective of the size of its target country network. Here, small contract size causes 
experienced exporters to fail to put in place proper safeguards. As one manager put it, “We should 
have been more careful. It was a small contract, so we lowered our guard” (Interview, Gamma 
Textiles).9 This configuration illustrates the interplay between distance and transaction size, even 
in the presence of antecedents that should prevent opportunism such as being an old firm and 
having experienced managers. This case shows the importance of capturing causality through 
configurations. Although younger firms may be more vulnerable when negotiating a large sale, 
older firms with experienced managers may be more at risk when negotiating a small one in a 
distant market because they knowingly underinvest in due diligence.  
Configuration 5 – Older firms with an experienced manager and a large network, entering 
a distant market. This configuration is one commonly discussed in the extant literature, whereby 
established firms with experienced managers and extensive networks enter a high distance market 
and tend to underestimate the extent to which distance increases the liability of foreignness, and 
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thus also the risk of opportunistic behaviour by importers (Verbeke and Kano, 2016; Eden and 
Miller, 2004). It illustrates that firms that have mechanisms to prevent opportunism, including 
experienced managers and networks, can still be victims of opportunistic behaviour when the 
markets entered are truly distant.  At the theoretical level, our findings confirm that, absent 
mechanisms to internalize transactions, a firm may experience opportunistic behaviour when 
entering new markets, as assumed by most studies of entry mode choice in the IB literature, and 
that geographical distance continues to be an important challenge (Tung and Verbeke, 2010; 
Verbeke and Ciravegna, 2018). From a managerial perspective, the implication is that in some 
specific contexts, such as that of a small exporter entering a distant foreign market, it may simply 
not be possible to eliminate the risk of opportunism short of fully internalizing the transactions 
involved. However, this solution may not be feasible given the one-shot nature of the contracts. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Much extant IB research on market entry has assumed opportunism (Hennart, 2010). 
Whether firms will enter foreign markets through equity-based investments or contracts is at least 
partly dependent on how human frailty can best be managed (Narula and Verbeke, 2015).  Yet, IB 
studies have seldom examined the conditions under which opportunism occurs, and this has had 
two effects.  First, the absence of empirical work on opportunism has reduced the predictive 
power of theory-based assertions for which the assumption of opportunism is critical.  Second, 
opportunism has remained under-contextualised, with most studies focusing on just one of its 
antecedents (Tsang, 2006; Verbeke and Greidanus, 2009).  
The discrepancy between what research has assumed and what it has actually measured, is 
the research gap we have tried to address. To our knowledge, our study is the first one in the 
international market entry literature to measure directly the antecedents of opportunism using 
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empirical evidence from decision makers actually involved in market entries.  In contrast to what 
prior literature suggests, we show that no single variable, such as the young age of firms, is by 
itself a sufficient antecedent of opportunism in new foreign market entry. Instead, specific 
configurations of antecedents must be in place for opportunism to surface, and there can be 
multiple configurations equifinally linked to importer opportunism. One can interpret these 
configurations as syndromes—sets of elements working together to create a scenario where 
deceitful economic actors can exploit an exporting firm’s vulnerability. We found support for 
opportunism, a basic, yet mostly untested, tenet of TCE-based analysis. When alternative 
structural governance mechanisms such as internalization are not feasible, opportunism does 
occur if a number of conditions are in place, even if firms have experienced managers and a large 
network in the target country (Coviello, 2006; Reuber and Fischer, 1997; Verbeke and Ciravegna, 
2018). 
The analysis of opportunism as an observed outcome arising in particular entry contexts, 
rather than as a human dispositional trait, suggests that this concept needs further review. As 
argued by Verbeke and Greidanus (2009) and Kano and Verbeke (2015), multiple managerial 
tools can be deployed to limit the occurrence and effects of opportunism, but even absent such 
tools, there may be particular market entry contexts in which opportunism is unlikely to occur, in 
spite of the clear presence of a vulnerability to contract violation.10 There are also specific 
conditions under which opportunism can affect firms in spite of the presence of elements that 
should help prevent it, such as managerial experience and large networks. 
The present study thus establishes a much-needed bridge between scholarly work based on 
TCE, which assumes opportunism as a default behavioural trait, and the practical needs of 
managers to anticipate and mitigate the effects of deceitful behaviour in international market 
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entries. The five configurations of antecedents to opportunism we identified lay a basis for 
actionable dialogue with managers on why opportunism sometimes occurs, and on the panoply of 
tools deployable to handle it (see also the rich contextual business case described in McGaughey 
et al., 2000).  
Our study’s main limitation is its focus on Chinese exporters of low-tech products. Future 
research should examine the conditions under which opportunism can affect larger firms even 
though they are often able to safeguard transactions vulnerable to opportunism by opening 
subsidiaries abroad. Another promising avenue for extending this research would be to examine 
opportunism by exporters against importers and suppliers. This would permit identifying 
‘patterns’ of who engages in opportunism in what particular conditions, who suffers its 
consequences, and which managerial tools could be deployed by potential victims to avert it. 
Future work could also experiment with alternative measures of distance and networks. For 
purposes of parsimony, we looked at a relatively small set of five, theory-derived, contextual 
antecedents of opportunism. Looking at other contexts would also help further develop the theory. 
Lastly we focused on exporters of low-tech products entering new markets.  The question arises 
whether the configurations of opportunism that we identified would still hold in the case of 
exports of higher-technology products or services, and for sequential entries in the same market.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Despite these limitations, our study can be a building block for a revitalised research 
agenda on international market entry. Our approach is conceptually grounded in mainstream IB 
theory, but adopts a configurational approach and allows constructive interaction with practicing 
managers in search of tools to identify and mitigate their firms’ vulnerabilities. Paradoxically, an 
increasing segment of the recent IB literature considers vulnerabilities resulting from frail macro-
level institutions such as inadequate regimes of protection of intellectual property rights.  It is 
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important that the scholarly community continues to address at the micro-level how firms are 
vulnerable to the deceitful behaviour of business partners. We would like to see more research 
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Table 1. Contextual antecedents of opportunism in foreign market entry in the prior empirical literature  
Antecedents  Empirical studies of opportunism (between brackets, the type of firms 
examined and the country of focus, if only one country) 
Present study 





John, 1984 (Franchises, US); Deeds and Hill, 1999 (Biotech alliances, US); 
Brown et al., 2000 (Hotel chains, US); Wu et al., 2007 (Exporters); Heide et 
al., 2007 (Manufacturers-distributors, US); Katsikeas et al., 2009 (Importers-
exporters); Styles and colleagues, 2008 (Exporters-importers); Lado et al., 
2008 (Producers-distributors); Luo et al., 2009 (Buyers-suppliers, China); 
Caniëls and Gelderman, 2010 (Information technology, Netherlands); El 
Akremi et al., 2011 (Franchises, France); Zhou and Xu, 2012 (Importers-
exporters); Handley and Angst, 2015 (Outsourcing) 
 
Controlled for: Entries 
in new markets using 





John, 1984 (Franchises, US); Parkhe, 1993 (Strategic alliances); Stump and 
Heide, 1996 (Buyer-supplier, US); Carson et al., 2006 (R&D partnerships, 
US); Luo, 2007a (Joint ventures); Luo, 2007b (Joint ventures); Heide et al., 
2007 (Manufacturers-distributors, US); Liu et al., 2009 (Manufacturers-
distributors, China); Ju et al., 2011 (Exporters-importers); Zhou and Poppo, 
2010 (Manufacturers-suppliers, China); Zhou and Xu, 2012 (Importers-
exporters); Handley and Angst, 2015 (Outsourcing) 
 






Provan and Skinner, 1989 (Equipment dealers, US); Parkhe, 1993 (Strategic 
alliances); Stump and Heide, 1996 (Buyers-suppliers, US); Rokkan et al., 
2003 (Manufacturers-distributors, US); Dickson et al., 2006 (R&D Alliances); 
Luo, 2007b (Joint ventures); Liu et al., 2009 (Manufacturers-distributors, 
China); Ju et al., 2011 (Exporters-importers); Katsikeas et al., 2009 
(Importers-exporters) 
 





entry share  
 





Dickson et al., 2006 (R&D Alliances); Wu et al., 2007 (Exporters); Katsikeas 
et al., 2009 (Importers-exporters)  
Controlled for: Similar 
firms. 
 




------ Measured: Managerial 
experience 
 




   
Search performed using ‘Opportunism’; ‘Opportunism + market entry’; ‘Opportunistic’; ‘Opportunistic + market 
entry’ on ABI/INFORM, Google Scholar and journals’ search engines, focusing on top-ranked Strategy and IB 
journals. Total of 65 studies found: 42 conceptual, 23 empirical. Table I, updated to 2016, shows the 23 empirical 
studies measuring opportunism in a real-world empirical context. The third column specifies whether the opportunism 
antecedents are ‘controlled for’ ex ante by our research design and sample definition, or whether they are ‘measured’ 
by including them as one of the antecedents in the fsQCA model. In parentheses, the type of transaction in which 
opportunism was measured in each paper.  
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Opportunism 133 0 3.82 4.17 1.28 1 6.17 
Managerial experience  133 0 6.85 5 5.13 1 33 
Market entry share 126 7 20.97 20 15.87 2 80 
Market distance (kms) 133 0 6,381 6,830 3,141.02 82 10,586 
Young age 133 0 4.58 3 4.96 0 21 
Network size 129 4 15.36 10 20.29 3 100 
Note: The number of foreign market entries per firm in the dataset varies. The dataset has several foreign market 
entries per firm, but it does not include all foreign market entries performed by the firm during its history.  
 
  












Number of cases with 
membership greater 




0 0 0 1 0 5 0.962 
1 1 0 1 0 6 0.943 
0 1 1 1 1 7 0.925 
0 1 0 1 0 6 0.922 
1 0 1 0 0 7 0.9 
1 1 1 0 1 6 0.889 
0 0 1 1 1 9 0.881 
1 0 1 0 1 5 0.876 
0 0 1 1 0 4 0.876 
0 1 1 1 0 4 0.875 
1 0 1 1 0 5 0.815 
1 0 1 1 1 16 0.813 
1 1 1 1 0 5 0.81 
1 1 1 1 1 16 0.789 






Table 4. Configurations linked to importers’ opportunism in new foreign market entry 
Antecedent Configuration number  
 1 2 3 4 5 
Managerial experience      
Market entry share      
Market distance      
Young age     
Network size      
Raw coverage 0.43 0.44 0.26 0.35 0.31 
Unique coverage 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.02 
Consistency 
 
0.84 0.83 0.91 0.88 0.86 
Solution coverage: 0.69      
Solution consistency: 0.81 
 
     
 = Absence of an antecedent; Presence of an antecedent; The presence or absence of the 
antecedent does not affect whether opportunism occurs.  
Each column represents a combination of antecedents, or a configuration, leading to the outcome ‘opportunism in the 
market entry’.  Configuration 1 represents a market entry performed by a young firm lacking managerial experience 
or a large network (market share in total exports and distance not relevant to opportunism). Configuration 2 represents 
a market entry by a young firm that lacks managerial experience and enters a distant market (market share in total 
exports and network size not relevant to opportunism). Configuration 3 represents an entry by a young firm into a 
non-distant market, with a large market share in total exports (managerial experience not relevant to opportunism). 
Configuration 4 represents the entry by an older firm with managerial experience into a distant market, with a small 
market share in total exports (network size not relevant to opportunism). Configuration 5 represents the entry by an 
older firm with managerial experience and a large network, entering a distant market (market entry share not relevant 









The conceptual model represents the contextual antecedents of opportunism by importers in the new foreign market 
entries of exporters. The model is based on the literature search reported in Table 1. The signs (+) and (-) represent 
the expected effects, i.e. whether, according to the extant literature, the antecedent is expected to be associated with 
opportunism (+) or to be preventing opportunism (-). For example, market distance (+), is expected to be linked to 








The configurations represent the five combinations of antecedents equifinally linked to importers’ opportunism in 
new foreign market entry. The signs (+) and (-) denote how each antecedent appears in each configuration that in our 
sample was linked to the occurrence of opportunism. For example, Configuration 1 depicts firms that do not have an 
experienced manager [Managerial experience (-)]; are young [Young age (+)]; and lack a large network size [Network 
size (-)]. Antecedents that do not have any effect on opportunism in that specific configuration, do not appear in the 
box representing such configuration. For example, in Configuration 2, market entry share is not relevant, and thus is 
not depicted in the box representing that configuration - Configuration 2 entails that a young firm entering a distant 
market without an experienced manager may suffer from opportunistic behaviour by importers disregarding of 
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4 Our search, which was updated in 2016, included the following journals: Academy of Management Journal, Academy of 
Management Perspectives, Academy of Management Review, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Global Strategy 
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5 We do not disclose the actual names of the CEO and company because of privacy concerns. 
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mode is the most efficient under particular circumstances. Such firms typically also have teams of managers working on 
export sales contracts so that it becomes more uncertain whether the researcher is surveying the relevant decision maker. 
7 Instrument used to measure opportunism, based on John (1984). Questions asked: (a) The buyer has always provided us a 
completely truthful picture of his business; (b) Complete honesty does not pay when dealing with this buyer; (c) Sometimes 
this buyer alters the facts slightly in order to get what he needs; (d) The buyer carries out his duties even if we do not check 
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8 We do not disclose the actual names of the CEO and company because of privacy concerns.  
9 We do not disclose the actual names of the CEO and company because of privacy concerns. 
10 Given a fixed level of asset specificity, a variety of contextual elements, e.g., in the institutional, economic and 
technological spheres, can increase or reduce the likelihood of opportunism. The challenge for future research is to 
determine when some of these contextual elements may actually ‘take over’ from asset specificity, so as to determine both 
the likelihood of opportunism materializing, and the safeguards needed to prevent it from occurring, or to mitigate its 
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effects.  In our view, the presence of managerial experience with a particular type of contracting and the systematic 
exercise of due diligence (meaning the absence of both negligence and hubris) as described in some of our scenarios with 
configurations of opportunism antecedents, may make the level of asset specificity just one, among many, parameters likely 
to be associated with opportunism and other expressions of unreliability. 
